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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The primary purpose of the Conference is to present diverse views
on plea bargaining. In addition to the articles, which represent varying
academic and policy perspectives, we have assembled a panel of
criminal law practitioners to contribute their insights and experience.
Their remarks provide a window into how plea bargaining functions in
the trial courts.
The panel consists of practitioners with backgrounds as prosecutors
and criminal defense lawyers at both the state and federal levels. Their
practice areas sweep broadly from homicide cases to white collar
offenses.
The transcript below ranges over a variety of issues. It begins with
brief introductions of the panelists followed by discussions of the
following subjects:
* Plea Bargaining and the Role of the Prosecutor in Charging
" The Role of Defense Counsel in Plea Bargaining
* The Role of the Victim and the Impact of Victims' Rights
* External Factors Affecting Plea Bargaining: Sentencing
Guidelines
For the reader's convenience, the discussion points above are
marked in the transcript.
DANIEL BLINKA: Good afternoon. Those of you who were
expecting or hoping for a musical interlude during the lunch hour are
about to be sorely disappointed. But we thought that since this is a
conference, and conferences are all about dialogue and discussion, that
we'd present a round table discussion entitled Plea Bargaining in
Wisconsin.
Now like most things in a criminal justice system, the reality is very
different from the label. First, you'll see there is no round table in any
way, shape, or form. Second, the title, Plea Bargaining in Wisconsin,
connotes or at least implies that there may be something unique or
special about how that practice is carried out in Wisconsin. I'm not sure
of that, but I am sure that the people who are joining us on this panel
today are likely to have far more insight into that than I do. It is really
my pleasure to have assembled here today a panel that represents some
of the very best criminal lawyers in the State of Wisconsin.
Let me start by introducing the panel. First, I'd like to introduce E.
MICHAEL MCCANN. Mike McCann had the distinction of serving as the
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District Attorney of Milwaukee County for thirty-eight years, from 1968
when he was first elected until January 1st of this year. Mike has been
very active over the decades in the ABA's criminal justice section. We
are very pleased that he has joined Marquette Law School as a Boden
Teaching Fellow and adjunct professor of law.
Sitting next to Mike, we have MICHELLE JACOBS. Michelle is the
First Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin. She has worked in that office for thirteen years in a variety
of positions, including as chief of the criminal division.
The third individual is ERIK PETERSON. Erik is currently the
United States Attorney for the Western District of Wisconsin, located in
Madison. Erik has extensive experience working in the state criminal
justice system as well. He spent seven years as the DA of Iowa County
and three years as an Assistant DA in Richland County; thus, he has a
background in state and federal, rural as well as urban, practice.
Next to Erik is DEAN STRANG. Dean is experienced in both state
and federal criminal defense. He's now in private practice in Madison
with the firm of Hurley, Burish and Stanton. Before moving to Madison,
Dean was the first Federal Defender in Wisconsin, located in
Milwaukee. Dean has extensive trial and appellate experience including
his role as co-counsel in a case that was much mentioned this morning,
namely United States v. Booker,' the landmark 2005 decision. While
Dean was practicing in Milwaukee, we were very fortunate to have him
teach a variety of courses on federal criminal procedure here at the Law
School.
Next to Dean is NATHAN FISHBACH. Nathan is a former federal
prosecutor who had a very distinguished career handling a number of
very high-visibility cases. He is now in private practice where he
handles any number of high-visibility white collar criminal defense cases
for corporations and individuals for the law firm of Whyte Hirschboeck
Dudek in Milwaukee.
And finally DEJA VISHNY is at the far end of the table. Deja is with
the Office of the State Public Defender here in Milwaukee. She heads
the homicide practice group in the State Public Defender's Milwaukee
office. We are also fortunate to have Deja as an adjunct professor at the
Law School where she teaches a trial advocacy course. Deja is also on
the faculty of the National Criminal Defense College.
So we have a very distinguished, very experienced panel, and I'm
1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S 220 (2005).
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grateful that they were able to join us today.
Now in terms of the protocol, what I will do is ask a series of
questions, and to the extent that we can draw upon the discussions in the
first two panels this morning and in the third panel that will follow this
afternoon, so much the better. Some questions will be directed to the
entire panel. Others, however, will be directed more at the prosecutors
or at the defense lawyers.
PLEA BARGAINING AND THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR IN
CHARGING
DANIEL BLINKA: The first thing that I want to address is the
critical issue of the prosecutor's discretion in plea bargaining. This is a
very rich, very important issue that I would like all members of the
panel to address. I'm going to ask the panelists to do something very
difficult, which is to try and take something this complex, drawing upon
their own experiences, and to try and capsulize it in maybe three or four
minutes, if at all possible. Specifically, I'd like you to address the role of
the prosecutor in charging and bargaining and the extent to which
charging decisions are affected by plea bargaining considerations. In
short, I want to consider the role of leverage. Mike, I'd like to start with
you.
E. MICHAEL MCCANN: Sure. First, I want to thank Marquette
for doing this. Having been a practitioner in the field all my life, it's so
important that the practice which governs so many dispositions in the
United States of America be subjected to serious scrutiny as you are
doing.
I finished law school in 1963 and started as an assistant district
attorney. I was shocked to see in the more serious cases the prosecutor
and the defense attorney would discuss with judicial involvement what
the disposition of the case would be. They would then go out and, on
the record, the judge would studiously extract from the defendant his
promise there had been no deals made, that he was doing this freely. As
a young lawyer, I was shocked by it. Everybody would attest to the
judge, yeah, there had been no deals cut. Of course, there's always a
break after you conferred with the judge, the defense attorney went out,
talked with the defendant, and then this went on the record to protect it
from being overturned someday. That stopped in Wisconsin in a
decision' in 1967 or '68 where the court said that's out, that's going to
2. State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970).
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end, no more judicial involvement, no more secret deals, and so on.
Everything's got to be on the record, and, as district attorney, I
implemented that very aggressively: There is going to be no
participation of the judges. You're going to put it on the record.
I think in assessing this, you have to have some basic idea what our
policy was. Number one, open file,3 everybody was going to get the full
file. Number two, we prized integrity. Ethical compliance was
important. You would earn respect in our office by being an ethical
person, and you would bring problems upon yourself if you acted
unethically. Also, there was a time when we used to talk with the
arresting officer and have the witnesses before us. That was the best
possible way to assess the case. Most offices assess off paper (the
reports written by police), as we do now presently. You rarely find, if
ever, a police officer say, "this is a lousy case" or "this witness that
accused this guy was drunk, I wouldn't trust him in court." Those who
criticize plea bargaining fail to realize that, and they somehow accord to
the initial prosecutor's decision to charge a pristine quality that's just
totally inaccurate.
Charging is the least informed stage for the prosecutor. He hasn't
talked to the victim, he hasn't talked to the witnesses, he maybe got a
biased report from a police officer. That case is going to change to a
very good extent, but there it is, it's issued at this least informed stage
where you haven't heard from the defense or what defense is available,
talked to the witnesses and so on. You do it under the press of time.
You can't review many of these cases. If there's a hundred cases in the
large metropolitan office, you can't lay over eighty of them for review
next week. That's got to be resolved right then and proceed forward.
So you're issuing charges many times with the realization that a final
assessment must await additional information, which may well result in
reduced charges. We had an express policy: no overcharging to gain a
negotiating advantage. We adopted basically the ABA principles on
charging from the prosecution standards. By the way, I'm on the panel
reworking those standards right now, which will be the fourth edition,
reviewing the prosecution and defense standards.
I always tried to hire people who acted reasonably. When I was a
young man, I thought that there was a conceptual overlay between a
person being kind and just and being liberal, but that isn't the case.
Some of the meanest bastards I ever met were liberals, and some of the
3. An "open file" policy generally means that the prosecutor opens his or her file to the
defense, with the exception of work product.
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most kind, gentle people were conservatives. I wanted people to charge
justly, work the courtroom justly. As I grew older, I felt better justice
arose with a mix.
For example, say a defendant charged with burglary is looking at
seven plus years on a sentence. The guy is in here for the third time.
The first time he was convicted of burglary for breaking into gas
stations. He got probation. Second time he got probation and three
months, or even three months at the House of Correction or the local
jail. Now he's coming in for the third time for burglary. I'm the
prosecutor in the case. Deja Vishny is the defense attorney. The charge
carries seven years or even ten years. Deja and I have been practicing in
front of Judge Smith for three years. We know Judge Smith is going to
give this guy two or three years, no matter what I say and no matter how
much she begs for probation. If I said five years or eight years, he's not
going to get it. He's going to get two or three years. And is this guilty
plea really a negotiation? Deja meets with me and asks if I am going to
do something extraordinary. Am I going to push for four years? Is that
going to happen? She wants to be alert to that. I want to know if she's
going to do anything special. I tell her that I'll recommend two or three
years. We both know, perhaps without even articulating it, that that's
what the judge is going to give this defendant. So is that really a plea
negotiation? Is there really a trade-off there where we realistically
know that no matter what we do, this is probably how the judge will
sentence her client. I don't look at that really as a bargain because there
isn't a real trade-off there.
I've felt where there's potential for abuse is within the charging
decision itself. What's the standard for charging? In our office,
basically the standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Is the
proof strong enough to result in a jury verdict? Sometimes, however,
you can't demand that level of proof. In a fast-breaking armed robbery
case you may be identifying off pictures. That isn't, in my opinion, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, but you need an arrest warrant to take
people into custody. So the potential for abuse turns on the charging
standard and the practices within a jurisdiction, such as an open files
protocol. I did not prize prosecutors who were "head-crackers," guys
that went for maximum sentences, because that isn't just. The people I
prized as assistant district attorneys brought judgment and experience to
the charging decision, a sense of fair play, a sense of justice, and that's a
difficult challenge for all of us. Nor is charging a science that yields one
correct answer. There are a hundred people gathered here today. We
all think of ourselves as just people. Yet if I presented the case of that
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three-time burglary, there would be a wide range of recommendations
here.
DANIEL BLINKA: Thanks Mike. And I want to return to some of
those points later. Deja, you heard Mike indicate that the official policy
in Milwaukee prohibited overcharging, particularly to extort a plea
bargain. As a member of the Office of the Public Defender, what's your
perception?
DEJA VISHNY: What Mike has said is generally true of the
Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office. As a person who also
does office-wide training for the State Public Defender, I've spoken with
defenders from across the state and I've had an opportunity to observe
different charging practices in other counties. There are other counties
that are going to be more likely to load up the charges, so to speak.
When I say it's generally true (of Milwaukee), I'm also saying it's not
true in each individual case. For example, there was a time when there
was a tax stamp law on the books of Wisconsin4 that was frequently
prosecuted by the Milwaukee DA's drug unit. This law required anyone
selling illegal drugs to purchase a tax stamp and thus pay the state taxes
on the sale of unlawful controlled substances. It was a give-away charge;
the prosecutor would dismiss the charge for not having a tax stamp in
order to make it easier to obtain a guilty plea to the primary drug
charge. The same kind of wheeling and dealing, so to speak, occurred
with the penalty enhancer for selling drugs within 1,000 feet of a school.5
So in the drug unit, I think I did see more charging policies that were
plea driven.
Another area where one sees this is in the domestic violence
prosecution area. There are a lot of prosecutors who will really charge
every possible crime in these cases. They know that domestic violence
cases are more difficult to prove because the complaining witness, the
victim, isn't likely to show up in court. There are a lot of bail jumping
charges issued in order to get an easy plea or secure a conviction in a
case where they're less likely to get it.
But one of the things I just want to add is there are a lot of
constituent groups that people don't always think about that influence
both charging and negotiating decisions. They're unofficial, but they're
important to people. For example, victims. Since the passage of the
Victims' Rights Act,6 there's more concern about the victim. For
4. See WiS. STAT. §§ 139.87-139.95 (2005-2006).
5. See WIS. STAT. § 961.49 (2005-2006).
6. See WIS. STAT. § 971.095 (2005-2006) (consultation with and notices to victim). For
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example, the prosecutor may think a case should be settled because it
isn't very strong, but is the victim going to make a big stink with the boss
and go to the press? Is the prosecutor going to spend more hours
dealing with this than she would trying the case? I've seen that happen.
And then there's the role of law enforcement. I'll just give you a
very small story. I represented a young man on a drug charge. This
wasn't a big case. It wasn't a homicide, but rather a very run-of-the-mill
drug delivery to a police officer. A warrant went out for the defendant's
arrest, yet he wasn't picked up for an entire year. When he got picked
up, during the interim, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided a case
that basically made it impermissible to use a single photo identification
procedure (known as a show-up); now the courts require that there be a
photo or in-person lineup used to make an identification There had
been a single photo identification in this case. After the police officer
had bought the drugs, he'd gone to the Sheriff's Department, pulled the
picture of the person named by the confidential informant, looked at the
picture, said "that's the guy," and the warrant went out. Based on the
new identification case, I brought a motion to suppress the identification
because of the single photo that was used. I brought it to the attention
of the prosecutor. He and I both knew that I was going to prevail on
that motion unless the judge wasn't going to follow the law. There was
really no question about it at this particular point. We were also in front
of a judge who did follow the law. But the prosecutor didn't want to
negotiate. The case was a felony. There was some other evidence that
the state had besides the police officer's testimony, so my client was
willing to take a misdemeanor. The prosecutor involved in that case
would not offer a misdemeanor until one day when we were in court on
something other than the motion hearing. Why? Because he didn't
want to get into an argument with the police officer who had bought the
drugs. The police officer was going to be angry and upset. He was from
a small suburban jurisdiction. This was a big case to this police officer,
and he was going to feel disrespected and unhappy with what occurred.
Eventually one day, when we were just in court for a scheduling matter,
the police officer wasn't there, the misdemeanor was on the table, the
client wanted it, the case settled. So, I think that does give you a little
bit of a flavor about how things that you don't necessarily think about
come into play in these kinds of cases.
DANIEL BLINKA: Michelle, from the perspective of the Eastern
the rights of victims generally, see WIS. STAT. ch. 950 (2005-2006).
7. State v. Hibl, 2006 WI 52, 290 Wis. 2d 595,714 N.W.2d 194.
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District of Wisconsin, to what extent are charging decisions affected by
plea bargaining considerations?
MICHELLE JACOBS: In the Eastern District of Wisconsin, and I
think in most federal jurisdictions, prosecutors have a lot of involvement
in the cases well before the cases are indicted. We are working with the
agencies and with the agents on investigations, often times really from
the outset. It's not that we don't do any reactive cases, some gun work,
bank robberies, things like that, but most of the time we've been
involved in the case well before it's ready for charging. We're not
necessarily reviewing the case, as Mike [McCann] said, on paper. Not
that that doesn't happen, we get a lot of paper, but we've really been
involved from the outset.
Now the standard for charging is dictated by the Department of
Justice. And just like Mike said, in federal court, we're going to charge
based on what we believe we can prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
We're not going to be presenting cases to the grand jury when we think
we can just get past the probable cause standard, which is the standard
used in the grand jury. In terms of how the charges and charging
decisions are impacted by plea negotiations, federal prosecutors, like the
state, in most instances, have an open file policy. We know that any
charging decisions that we make are going to be reviewed by the
defense, in terms of reviewing pretty much every piece of paper we have
from law enforcement. So we are going to seek charges, and the
Department of Justice requires us to seek charges that are the most
serious readily provable offenses. But when I say that, what I mean is
the most serious charge that we believe, that we're confident we can
prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
When I craft an indictment, just as an example, let's say in a wire
fraud case, I may be charging ten counts of wire fraud in order to
encompass a scheme to defraud that's lasted over five years. I choose a
variety of counts so that I can adequately and completely describe that
scheme to defraud. Do I think if the defendant decides to plead guilty
that I'm going to require them to plead guilty to all ten counts? No.
But I'm also charging in order to ensure that if the case proceeds to trial,
that I have again adequately described that scheme and I'm going to be
able to present my evidence of the entirety of the scheme. In terms of a
plea bargain or a plea negotiation, I don't really think of those dismissed
charges as a "bargain." Suppose I dismiss nine of those ten counts, in
the federal system the sentencing exposure for defendants most often
will be virtually identical to the sentencing exposure when they plead
guilty to all ten of those counts.
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In short, I have two things in mind. I have plea negotiations in mind,
but I also have trial in mind. I'm trying to craft an indictment so that I
will be seeking a plea to the most serious, readily provable offense for
which I've got an adequate factual basis and that is going to resolve the
case and which reflects all of the things that the sentence is supposed to
reflect, including a restitution order for the victim.
So when I'm thinking through charging decisions, I am considering
plea negotiations and trial. I'm trying to charge in a way that's
consistent with Department of Justice policy, but also those
considerations down the road, depending on which way the case goes.
DANIEL BLINKA: Thank you. Nathan, you represent white-collar
clients, and given your background in the Justice Department, at what
point do you become involved in trying to influence the prosecutors'
perception of the case?
NATHAN FISHBACH: First of all, I'm not a criminal defense
attorney. I'm a member of a corporate law firm. We do not provide
criminal defense. I represent people who have misunderstandings with
the government. [Laughter]
Generally, it's a proceeding driven by bad manners as opposed to
any type of crime. [Laughter]
To answer your question, I become involved at a very early stage,
before the charge is even issued. This is because the government's
actions before the charge is issued are critical. The law enforcement
process is so front-end loaded that you want to become involved at an
early stage to participate in the crafting of a possible resolution. The
type of white-collar cases described by Michelle [Jacobs] would bear this
out. The question is not so much whether there's a bank robbery and
whether your client did it. Rather, it's something quite different. Is this
a crime or is this a regulatory matter? If it is a regulatory matter, should
it be charged? Did this person have criminal intent? These are the
types of issues that have to be answered early on.
My concern is that many of the federal agencies who investigate
these cases devote a substantial amount of time and resources to the
matters. Some investigations take eighteen months, two, two-and-a-half
years. Naturally, many agents become quite attached to the cases
because they have worked so hard on them. It's very important for the
defense lawyer to discuss the matter with the prosecutor at an early
stage. The more time the investigators devote to a case and the more
momentum the case gains, then the government becomes less inclined to
decline prosecution.
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What is my strategy? Very often, at an early stage, I prepare what is
known as an "anti-prosecution memorandum." A number of former
prosecutors have written about what this is. In many U.S. Attorney's
Offices, including Milwaukee, the prosecutor prepares a "prosecution
memorandum," describing the possible charges, the evidence supporting
the charges, and the possible defenses. I prepare something different-
an "anti-prosecution memorandum." This is because in white-collar
cases, it is not unusual for everyone to agree upon the facts. The issue
becomes whether the events constitute a crime, so I bring that issue
forward right away.
We talked a few moments ago about who is involved in the charging
process. The most important people are the line attorneys because they
will prepare the prosecution memorandum. This is the government's
version of the events at issue, which often becomes "the bible" of the
case for the prosecution.
There are supervisors who review the matter prior to the issuance of
the charges. I would like the supervisors to review the anti-prosecution
memorandum as a part of their consideration of whether charges should
be issued.
I recall that when I was working on a criminal tax case as a
prosecutor, the defense lawyer delivered a detailed oral presentation as
to why his client should not be charged. I later reviewed the section of
the IRS Special Agent's Report which listed "anticipated defenses" and
it said, "none known." I want to make sure that the officials in the client
agency and the prosecutors know what the defenses are. This is
accomplished through the anti-prosecution memorandum.
Frequently, the supervisors in the client agency and in the
Department of Justice in Washington do not advocate an aggressive
charge. This is because they are concerned about this case's impact
upon other similar cases in the agencies around the country. If they
believe adverse case law might be created through this prosecution,
perhaps they will not proceed with the charge.
I think Professor Burke's article" is really helpful because she talks
about the prosecutor's motivations. You think about the line attorney,
you think about the supervisors, and you think about the client agencies
when informing the government of your defense through the anti-
prosecution memorandum.
DANIEL BLINKA: Erik, from the perspective of a federal
8. Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007).
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prosecutor with over ten years in a state system, how have you found the
charging decisions come into play in affecting plea bargaining
considerations?
ERIK PETERSON: In the federal system, I really don't have a lot to
add to what Michelle said. I think the Western District of Wisconsin is
very similar to the Eastern District of Wisconsin. We charge the most
serious readily provable offense. It happens all across the country. And
really, in response to your question, "How does the charging affect your
thoughts of the plea later on down the road?" we expect a plea or a
resolution to the most serious readily provable offense, whether that
means a plea or that means trial and whatever happens at trial. The
federal system just isn't made to handle what happens sometimes in the
state system, where a felony is dropped down to a misdemeanor. It just
doesn't work that way in the federal system, especially with the
sentencing guidelines. But I don't have a lot to add to what Michelle
said.
DANIEL BLINKA: What about your experience at the state side?
ERIK PETERSON: On the state side, again, I really agree with
what Mike [McCann] said-the benefit of going last, I guess. You never
want to see overcharging. Having been an elected DA and also an
assistant DA, you never want to see overcharging to gain some
advantage.
DANIEL BLINKA: Erik, let me just stop you. This is the teacher in
me. What do you mean by overcharging?
ERIK PETERSON: Take the tax stamp example [used by Deja
Vishny]. I mean, if you really don't need it, if there's no point in adding
the charge, if the thought process-and who knows, you can never get
into an assistant DA's head-is "I'm going to throw this in to get a plea
but I have no intention of proving this up at trial," then you have a real
problem. You should only charge what you intend to go through with
later on down the road.
Comparing state to federal practice, the biggest difference I'm
seeing, Michelle alluded to it, is the early involvement of the federal
prosecutor in the investigative stage of the case. A prosecutor can help
shape and craft the case; you know it pretty well. You don't necessarily
know the defense perspective but you know it fairly well early on. As a
state prosecutor, I'd get a stack of reports with a bow wrapped around
them dropped on my desk. You read them and you charge the case.
You have hundreds of these things and you run through them. As a
prosecutor, you haven't been involved in the investigative process, you
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haven't grand juried witnesses, and you haven't evaluated them
yourself. While a defense lawyer is very valuable in a federal case, in a
state case, the defense can open your eyes to things that you had no idea
about unless it was contained in the police reports. You really don't
have any other knowledge of the case. So it's a little different in that
regard, based on our early involvement on the federal side.
DANIEL BLINKA: Thank you. Dean [Strang], as one who has
defended both high visibility state and federal cases, in terms of
overcharging, what are your perceptions of how prosecutors exercise
their discretion?
DEAN STRANG: Overcharging is common, but commonly
unintended. I think in federal court, when I say unintended, in the cases
that Michelle [Jacobs] is going to charge as mail fraud or wire fraud,
functionally she has unlimited discretion.
The unit of prosecution is so flexible by design in many offenses in
the United States Code, that she really can do almost anything she
wants. You also have, in federal court, a heavy reliance-obviously I'm
not saying anything you folks don't know-on conspiracy charges, which
broaden as a practical matter the evidentiary scope that she'll enjoy at
trial. She also has much latitude in picking and choosing to some
extent-albeit with Main Justice looking over her shoulder-but picking
and choosing among mandatory minimum sentences that may apply.
I see these things as a defense lawyer. I see cases as almost routinely
overcharged at least when one looks at what the client probably really
intended, what his station in life has been and the difficulty of a
conversation with a client in which I say, "You don't understand, to win
this we need to run the board. For the prosecutor to win it, she needs to
win one count and so when this jury compromises, the defense just loses,
we flat out lose."
In state court, at least my experience has been that these things also
usually are overcharged, although probably unintentionally. It's a
function typically in state court of the prosecutor either
misapprehending the probable state of mind of the defendant and
charging intent when it really ought to be recklessness, for example, or
the prosecutor working off paper, as people have described, rather than
working off people.
THE ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
PLEA BARGAINING
DANIEL BLINKA: What I'd like to do is turn to the other side of
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the plea bargaining or plea negotiation equation, which is the role of the
defendant. I think that there's a tendency in this literature to focus on
criminal codes, sentencing, the role of the prosecutor, all very
understandable and important, but the other side of it is the role of
defense counsel. Professor Bibas as well as Professor Covey this
morning talked about the role of the defendant and making "the right
call" or "the right decision. '
When a prosecutor makes an offer to you, ethically you are
obligated to take that to the client because it's the client's decision.
What factors do you take into account in deciding what you're going to
say to your client or how hard you're going to push the client to accept
the negotiation? My assumption is that most of the time, good lawyers
as you are, the client is going to follow your advice.
DEAN STRANG: And that's my starting point. I can dress this up
so that you don't all think I'm violating the Wisconsin Rules of
Professional Conduct, but I decide whether the client is taking this plea
agreement. I decide it nearly 100% of the time. That's even true in
private practice, although that's where the fractional difference would
come in. I was a public defender backwards in the sense that I was
fifteen years in private practice before I took my first job as a public
defender. It was humbling to see just how completely I was the decision
maker for that client base. But even with retained clients, I try to
practice law empathetically; I'm avoiding a buzz word like holistic
practice because I don't subscribe to it entirely. But if I'm trying to
practice with empathy, as I am, I also think it's my responsibility to
interpose myself between sovereign and client and to shoulder a good
deal of the responsibility for whether that plea agreement is made.
Now, if I've developed a relationship of trust with the client, he never is
going to-almost never-is going to second-guess me. So I've got to get
it right. Certainly, I take every offer to the client; it never requires a
hard sell, and-"never" is too strong-it almost never requires a hard
sell for the client either to take it or to decline it when that makes more
sense. Again, I could dress it up, but that's the truth.
DANIEL BLINKA: Deja [Vishny], as a public defender
representing indigents, is it your experience as well that clients make
you the decision maker by default or otherwise?
DEJA VISHNY: It's not really by default, but I agree that I'm
mostly the decision maker. I don't think it's 100% of the time. In other
9. Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and
Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213 (2007).
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words, I have had clients decline to do what I thought probably would
have been a better outcome for them. But one of the things that I have
found is that although I may be the decision maker, it's done by
empowering the client to come to the best decision for their case. In
other words, the more they are informed about their case-reading the
discovery, being present when motions are litigated, reviewing the jury
instructions and the law in their case-the more they are empowered.
Going through this process enables the lawyer to hear what the client
wants, what their concerns are and what's really important to them in
the case. The better a lawyer understands what the client wants, the
better the lawyer will perform as a negotiator.
I have to tell you that unfortunately I've seen a lot of lawyers yelling
at their clients in the bullpens, trying to pressure their clients into plea
negotiations. It is just the wrong thing to do. Even if the lawyer is
correct in his judgment that the client is going to get more time if he or
she has a trial, or that it is in the client's best interest to take the
negotiation, the more the lawyer really empowers that person and helps
them to make the decision, the better off the client is going to be and the
better off one is as a lawyer.
A client has to have confidence in his or her lawyer. In general,
clients have less confidence in public defenders because we're appointed
and they see us as a part of the state. I think it's very important that the
public defender goes and sells herself to the client and makes it really
clear to the client that-not that you have me and you have no choice
but to have me-but that you want to have me as your lawyer. I think
that really ultimately helps a lawyer in negotiations with clients. Clients
need the benefit of our opinions, though we may put them in a subtle
way as to whether negotiations should be accepted.
DANIEL BLINKA: Nathan?
NATHAN FISHBACH: By the time that the client reaches the
decision of whether to agree to a proposed resolution short of trial, the
client's life has changed. For a corporation under investigation, the
corporation must be concerned about its different stakeholders, such as
lenders, customers, vendors, licensing boards, etc. These stakeholders
have an impact upon a corporation even before the corporation decides
to plead guilty or not guilty.
And so, after you review the evidence, you say to the client, "Well,
do you want certainty?" I state: "Everyone wants an Act Two. So the
question is do you want certainty or do you want to roll the dice?" And
that really is what the decision comes to. At this point in the client's life,
he or she will never be the same. The question becomes: How does the
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client pick up from the ashes and move on?
THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM AND THE IMPACT
OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS
DANIEL BLINKA: What I'd like to turn to now is something that
was adverted to earlier, which is the very different role of the victim in
the criminal justice system today. Mike, let me start with you. From the
vantage point of thirty-eight years of experience, how has the
involvement of victims or victims' families changed over those decades?
E. MICHAEL MCCANN: Very dramatically. I recommend that
you read an article out of the Notre Dame Law Review from about the
early 1970s.1" The formal subpoena used in Milwaukee County
employed ancient English, to the effect that, "be ye, therefore, setting
aside all your affairs, come to the courtroom" and so on. Citizens were
treated like chunks of meat that were jerked back and forth by the
prosecutor. We were all taught in law school that the state is the victim
in the case, that these people are only witnesses. That was the ancient
idea, of course. Once, a woman in a hearing stood up and said, as things
began to change, "The state wasn't raped, I was raped!" And it was
changing-really they were abused.
I remember it very well because [the Milwaukee County District
Attorney's office] got one of the two largest grants in the country.
When Donald Santerelli was chosen to head the LEAA" at the start of
Nixon's second term in 1972, Santarelli later told me that he didn't know
what to do. He was afraid of the serious conservative right wing agenda
and so came up with the idea of promoting victims' rights. And he
announced that publicly. I read about it in the newspaper. Mike Ash
had written the article I described earlier. He was on my staff and we
had a friend about half-way up the hierarchy at LEAA. We called and
made an appointment and put together about a five-page package
requesting $75,000 to advance a victims' rights program in Milwaukee
County. I flew down to DC to meet this chap, but he was ill that day,
which usually meant you'd be bumped down. Instead, I was bumped up,
which surprised the hell out of me. And then there's a chap, already
he's got the file, going over it, shaking his head back and forth, and he
finally said to me, "This is way too small, we want something big." We
came back and got a $1.2 million dollar grant, one of the first large
10. Michael Ash, On Witnesses: A Radical Critique of Criminal Court Procedures, 48
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 386 (1972).
11. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
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national grants to promote victims' rights. I became active in the ABA
in that regard, served as the chair of the victims' committee of the ABA
Criminal Justice Section.
That was the beginning, the early stages. Wisconsin was one of two
states to adopt victims' rights programs. Victims are in a totally
different situation now than they were then. Radical change began I'd
say with Donald Santarelli's statement in 1972 or January of 1973.
Money went into it. Victims' rights became a federal program across
the nation. There were no victim-witness people in the courts at that
time. The victims' rights idea hadn't yet been conceptualized. Go back
and read the old literature. You don't see victims' rights spoken of
before the early 1970s.
So it's been dramatic changes. Does it affect plea bargaining? Yes.
By law, in our state, we have to notify the victim that he has a right to
participate in plea negotiation, to express to the district attorney what
his positions are, not to govern the process, a right to be notified of it
and to express his position on it. Victims have a right to speak in court
at sentencing. Judges are to listen to them. I think sometimes
defendants consider what will happen if the victim comes into court and
testifies and so on.
So victims have changed the process dramatically, properly and
good. Some of them are vindictive. Some of them aren't looking for
justice, they're looking for vengeance. And it's up to a district attorney
to see that that doesn't happen, that you don't have the courts become
instruments of excessive vindictiveness and improper and unjust
sentencing because of that. But that's part of the DA's role and that's
certainly the role of the judge. The role of the victim is definitely
dramatically changed, unquestionably.
DANIEL BLINKA: Mike, do you find that the victim has become a
de facto decision maker? In Wisconsin, state district attorneys are
elected every four years. The reality of the politics is that you have to
consider whether some victim is going to say, "I will not accept that
deal. I will take it to the press. I will scream loud and long." To what
extent do you grapple with those concerns?
E. MICHAEL MCCANN: Any district attorney who would be
induced by that to recommend an unjust sentence is a pusillanimous
individual who doesn't belong in the criminal justice system. There will
be some of course who will be persuaded by that. It's sometimes
difficult to educate the public. You see a victim aggressively victimized
and there's understandably excitable sympathy. But that doesn't mean
there should be an unjust sentence. There are pusillanimous judges who
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will be influenced by that, no question about it. This is hard to believe
and it's something you'll never read in the literature, but those of you
who have practiced in the court, you know it's true. Some judges will
give one sentence with a reporter in court and a different sentence if a
newspaper reporter is not there. That's a tragedy of our system.
Are there DAs that will do that? Yes. Are most DAs rogues? No, I
don't think they are. Do most DAs go for the longest sentence? I don't
think they do. I have a son who's a lawyer and he's thirty-three years
old. We're having a pizza one day in Chicago and I asked my son,
"What's your salary?" Now I've been practicing for at least thirty years
and consider myself a pretty damn good lawyer. Yet his salary already
exceeds mine by many thousands of dollars. And I think to myself,
"Why the hell am I picking up the bill for this pizza?"
But many DAs are in office because they're drawn for another
reason. Those of you who practice know that. The lady that spoke
about passionate DAs12 obviously has an affection in her heart for DAs.
The depiction of DAs as rascals and rogues, as hard-fisted boobs such as
in the Perry Mason series-you know, Mr. Burger, the last guy onto
what's happening-is a stereotypical description. Are there DAs with
excessive ambitions? Yes. But for the most part, I think they're decent
honorable people. I graduated from two law schools. Every time I've
seen a break-out of how economically the people in my class have done,
I have always been in the bottom quartile. So the people that choose a
public career for the most part are foregoing many advantages and are
in my opinion, for the most part, decent people who are not hard-fisted
skull crushers.
DANIEL BLINKA: Erik-and I don't mean that the last remark
somehow implicated you, but the-
ERIK PETERSON: Thank you for that. I appreciate it.
DANIEL BLINKA: Erik, would you contrast your experience with
the role of the victims in both the state and the federal system?
ERIK PETERSON: Sure. First I'll say that I'm realizing that Dean
[Strang] and I are not that far apart. Maybe we should just switch jobs
for a week. He talked about his role with his clients and making the
decision. All that the victims' rights laws require, very simply, on both
the state and federal sides, is consultation with the victims. It's not that
prosecutors have to do what they [victims] want. Now pragmatically
that can be difficult. I understand those concerns, but really it's about
12. Burke, supra note 8.
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education of victims. And this applies really at both the federal and
state levels.
The biggest problem for victims, if we're talking about preconceived
notions, is the word "bargain" in "plea bargain." When victims come
into the room, they usually haven't met with the prosecutor first; rather,
they've met with the Victim Witness Coordinator in the office. The
phrase "plea bargain" is commonly used; it's sometimes in letters sent to
victims and it's what the Victim Witness Coordinator says. When family
members talk about it, they say, "Oh, you can't take a plea bargain,
that's horrible." Victims come in and think you're giving away the store.
I'd walk down the street-when I was DA in a small county-or get
stopped in Wal-Mart and people asked, "Why did you do this plea
bargain, you're giving everything away?" This was ludicrous if you
knew any of the facts of the case, but it's all about the word "bargain"
and what people seem to assume from watching television, news
coverage, whatever else.
So that's the biggest problem. I see that on both levels, state and
federal prosecution. The prosecutor must educate victims, talk with
them about what the process is, whatever I want to call it, pre-trial
resolution, plea agreements, et cetera. We could talk about threats by
victims saying "hey, I'm going to go to the press," yet I don't think that
ever happened to me. And maybe I'm just lucky, but in eleven years,
that hasn't happened. Once I explain "here's what I'm doing, here's
why, here are the difficulties of the case, here are the choices we have to
make," I really haven't had problems. And there are huge differences
at either level, the state or federal level, pragmatic differences and
sentencing guidelines, et cetera. We can probably give victims,
especially in the Western District of Wisconsin, a little better idea what
a sentence is going to be with the sentencing guidelines, even post-
Booker in the Western District.
DANIEL BLINKA: Michelle, from the perspective of the Eastern
District and as one who's handled a variety of federal prosecutions, first,
does the victim's voice differ or become stronger in certain classes of
cases than in other classes of cases? Second, when do you consult the
victim? We know that these statutes require consultation. Is it when
the decision is still dynamic and fluid or is it after you've decided what
to do and then you take it to the victim and say this is what I
recommend?
MICHELLE JACOBS: Well, with respect to what kinds of cases and
is it different in different kinds of cases, of course we prosecute a lot of
non-victim cases where we're not dealing with this issue. But I think
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that it resonates for me in different ways depending on the kind of case
it is, depending on what I know my evidence to be or not to be,
depending on what I think a trial is going to look like for that victim,
and the likely outcome at trial. There are all kinds of considerations
that I'm thinking about when I consult with the victim.
Just as an example, I prosecuted a case a couple of years ago
involving the homicide of a father of four young boys. His wife had
never worked outside the home and his fifteen-year-old boy was going
to step up-and really did have to step up-and become the father of
the household and that sort of thing. And when we were addressing
potential plea offers and plea negotiations with that family, there were
emotional considerations that I wanted to make sure that I could gently
and appropriately relay to that family and to the mother of those
children, the spouse of the victim, that are different than a white-collar
case where my victim maybe is a bank or investors. And a lot of times,
that's different, too, depending on whether you have elderly investors
who have lost their retirement income. Depending on the case, it seems
to me so different in the way that it resonates and how I have to
approach the consultation with the victim.
Now, I think that all prosecutors look at that consultation a little bit
differently. For me personally, typically by the time I'm at a point in a
case where I'm even starting to think about presenting a plea offer, I
have in my own mind what I think the appropriate resolution from the
government's perspective is going to be or should be. So I can't say that
I go into a consultation with a victim with no idea what I'm going to
offer or want to offer, but I certainly approach that consultation with the
victim before I have made my mind up. If I've completely made up my
mind, it seems like somewhat of a meaningless "consultation." I think it
is important for the prosecutor to appreciate what the impact of these
cases are on victims. It could be very easy, I suppose, to step back and
wall myself off from that, get my offer in mind, tell the victim okay, what
do you think and tell me whatever they want to tell me and walk away.
But I would not be doing my job-bottom line. And so when I go into
those consultations, I'm going in listening, trying to understand and
appreciate what kind of impact that case has had.
I also, though, agree that that consultation has to be an educational
process with the victim, if you haven't done that already. I'm
prosecuting a case right now in the Northern District of Illinois. It's one
of these child support enforcement cases. There's been a guilty plea,
and the victim is out about $140,000 in past child support. The
defendant has acknowledged through his plea that he has never made a
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payment voluntarily in the child's eighteen years. This is an autistic
child, so there were a lot of considerations in working with that victim
very early on, in educating her about the process, educating her about
what the potential was in terms of restitution collection, what a trial
would be like if we were to go to trial, whether a trial was going to make
any real and significant difference in terms of sentence. There are a lot
of considerations. But I worked with her early on in the case, before we
got to the point where there was any interest shown by the defendant in
a guilty plea. And if I've worked with the victim and they understand
the system and they understand the likely outcome, then by the time we
get to that point, their input can be much more meaningful. Just like
Dean [Strang] was talking about regarding input with a client-in some
ways I view that victim as a client.
EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING PLEA BARGAINING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
DANIEL BLINKA: What I'd like to do in the short time we have
remaining is turn to some more pointed questions, particularly the
external factors that affect plea bargaining, such as the going rate. One
of them, of course, has been the advent of sentencing guidelines, both
before and after the Booker decision. And since we have Mr. Booker's
lawyer with us today, it seems that the best person to address this
question first would be Dean Strang. Dean, have you seen the going
rates change since the Booker decision came down?
DEAN STRANG: It depends radically where you are, in which
district and within a district, in front of which judge. It really does
because for instance, in Erik's [Peterson] district, and there are a few
like it I suspect in the country, Booker is nothing but a name. It has
changed nothing in the sentences that the district court imposes. Now,
in the Eastern District [of Wisconsin], which is a little bit different, you
have a variation in how quickly the district judges have shaken off the
habituation to the sentencing guidelines; here and there you have a
judge who realizes he or she isn't caged anymore and can sort of wing it
around the room a little bit rather than just sitting on the perch without
the cage. In the Eastern District and many others, the prosecutors'
ability to define and control the sentence unquestionably has been
reduced. And part of what has happened, as a practical matter, is the
defendant has been empowered to plead blind, to simply take his
chances, so to speak, at sentencing. In these districts, Booker really has
changed not only the ability of the prosecutors to dictate the sentence
but to enforce appeal waivers, for example, or other collateral, onerous
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terms of a plea bargain, because we can go in and just plead. So that's
made a difference.
Again, though, in other places, not so. I mean, Freddy Booker's
experience in the Western District of Wisconsin illustrates the point.
The case came out of Beloit and was prosecuted in Madison, and its
outcome captures the situation in the Western District [of Wisconsin]
and some other districts. He came back for resentencing and got, to the
very day, the same sentence he had gotten originally. So what he got
out of that case is a certain rock-star quality in prison. [Laughter]
People in federal prison want to come up and touch his shirt or
something. But that was it.
DANIEL BLINKA: Erik, your response?
ERIK PETERSON: Dean's right. In the Western District of
Wisconsin with the two judges we have, I think the figure-you may
know-ninety-one percent-roughly ninety-some percent of all
sentences are still within the guidelines. Booker pragmatically has not
changed the practice of the judges in the district, so that's absolutely on
point. I'm curious-and I'm just curious-I don't know the answer.
You talked about the cage being removed. In other districts, is it always
down, does it go up at some points?
DEAN STRANG: Yes.
ERIK PETERSON: I'm just curious, I don't know. I don't get to
other districts.
DEAN STRANG: There are Booker losers just as there are Booker
winners. To some extent all defendants, particularly on a plea
agreement, are Booker losers in that what a client tends to value most-
and this will resonate with what our social scientists were saying on the
other panels-what the client tends to value most is predictability, is
some certainty. You know, "If I do this, what will happen? I'll miss my
kid's eighth grade graduation, but I'll see the high school graduation,"
or "I can bet my wife will stick around if it's three years in prison, but
I'm not so sure she will if it's six," or whatever. And Booker has eroded
that ability of defense counsel to say with a high degree of likelihood,
look if you plead guilty, this is what's going to happen. After Booker,
there certainly are sentences that are higher than the advisory range. I
was practicing before the sentencing guidelines and Booker brings us
back to the art of counseling as defense lawyers and attaches a premium
to understanding the judge, where the guidelines discounted that
experience and understanding.
DANIEL BLINKA: In the interest of predictability and certainty,
[91:357
2007] CRIMINAL LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE 379
and as long as we're on Booker, I've been instructed that we end this
session on time. Please join me in thanking our panel.
* * *
